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Abstract
Ambiguity preferences are important to explain human decision-making in many ar-
eas in economics and finance. To measure individual ambiguity preferences, the ex-
perimental economics literature advocates using incentivized laboratory experiments.
Yet, laboratory experiments are costly, time-consuming and require substantial ad-
ministrative effort. This study develops an experimentally validated ambiguity pref-
erence survey module that can reliably measure ambiguity preferences when carrying
out laboratory experiments is impractical. This toolkit may have wide applications,
including end-of-session lab questionnaires, large scale surveys and financial client
assessments.
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11 Introduction
In many circumstances of everyday life, people take decisions in uncertain environments. In
most situations, the probabilities of the possible outcomes are only vaguely known to decision
makers, if at all. Since the seminal works of Knight (1921) and Ellsberg (1961), the absence of
precise information on probabilities is referred to as ambiguity, and has been recognized as a
form of uncertainty distinct from the standard notion of risk.
Preferences towards ambiguity – and ambiguity aversion in particular – have shown to be an
important determinant of individual decision-making.1 Incorporating ambiguity preferences in
economic models helps to explain a variety of phenomena in economics and finance that cannot
be attributed to risk aversion alone.2
Given the importance of ambiguity preferences for a wide range of decisions in everyday life,
it is important for empirical researchers to measure these preferences. The experimental eco-
nomics literature advocates measuring ambiguity preferences using decision tasks incentivised
with money in laboratory settings. However, these procedures are costly, time-consuming, and
often complex to implement.
The objective of this paper is to provide a tool to measure ambiguity preferences when carrying
out laboratory experiments is impractical, such as in large scale surveys or field studies. We
develop an ambiguity preference survey module by combining hypothetical thought experiments
and attitudinal questions that can reliably predict ambiguity preferences. Individual ambiguity
preferences are measured using a standard, incentivised decision task following the experimen-
tal tradition. The hypothetical thought experiments are taken from the economics literature,
while the attitudinal questions are predominantly from the psychology literature on ambigu-
ity (in)tolerance. These measures operationalise the concept of ambiguity as vagueness about
outcome probabilities (typical in economics), as well as aversion to novelty, complexity and in-
solubility. Applying a rigorous selection procedure that considers all possible combinations of
thought experiments and attitudinal questions, this paper identifies a concise set of predictors
that explain a large part of the variation in ambiguity preferences elicited experimentally.
The ambiguity preference survey module consists of five survey items. The first item is a hypo-
thetical, path-dependent thought experiment in the spirit of the original Ellsberg (1961) two-
1Empirical studies show that ambiguity aversion can explain, among others, patterns in stock market partic-
ipation (Bianchi and Tallon, 2018; Dimmock, Kouwenberg and Wakker, 2016; Dimmock, Kouwenberg, Mitchell
and Peijnenburg, 2016) and health behaviours among adolescents (Sutter et al., 2013).
2For example, theoretical models show that ambiguity aversion can explain the lower than expected investment
in financial markets (e.g. Dow and Werlang, 1992; Bossaerts et al., 2010) and real investment projects (e.g.
Nishimura and Ozaki, 2007), the economic evaluation of climate change (e.g. Weitzman, 2009), the equity premium
puzzle (e.g. Collard et al., 2018) or low reservation wages for job searchers (e.g. Nishimura and Ozaki, 2004).
2colour urn experiment. At the same time, this item is the best single predictor of ambiguity
preferences. The survey module includes four attitudinal questions. In addition, we also propose
a more parsimonious survey module that consists of a smaller subset of three items in total, the
thought experiment and two attitudinal questions. Yet, this smaller module comes at the cost
of a lower explanatory power. To make the ambiguity preference module easy to use in practical
applications, we also propose a ready-to-use ambiguity preference score that allows a simple and
quick assessment of ambiguity preferences once the survey data has been collected.
We test the validity of the ambiguity preference module using a variety of tests. First, we
examine how well the preference module can explain ambiguity preferences in-sample. Second,
we resort to an entirely different sample of subjects of similar size to test the predictive power
of the preference module out of sample. Finally, we use a test-retest procedure to establish
a benchmark against which the quality of the preference module can be compared. Taken
together, these tests show that the ambiguity preference module allows the reliable measurement
of ambiguity preference for different samples of subjects.
This paper is related to several streams of literature. Most of all, the paper complements
a number of studies that propose survey modules to measure economic preferences without
relying on incentivized experiments. So far, this literature has focused on risk preferences,
impatience and trust, but has neglected ambiguity preferences. For example, Dohmen et al.
(2011) show that a self-reported willingness to take risks correlates with experimentally elicited
risk preferences. Questions of this type are now routinely used to measure risk preferences
in large surveys, including the German Socio-Economic Panel and other surveys (Guiso and
Jappelli, 2008; Vieider et al., 2015; Donkers et al., 2001).
Similarly, time preferences are collected in surveys using self-reported attitudes on impatience
and hypothetical choice tasks of present and future rewards (Cole et al., 2013; Bernard et al.,
2014). Trust can be measured using attitudinal trust questions, which has been shown to
correlate with behaviour in trust games (Fehr et al., 2003). Most closely related to this paper
is a recent study by Falk et al. (2016) that examines the ability of hypothetical decision tasks
and survey questions to predict preferences for risk, time discounting, altruism, trust, positive
and negative reciprocity in incentivised tasks. Like our paper, they propose a survey module
to measure these six preferences. This preference module is then used to measure economic
preferences in 76 countries around the globe (Falk et al., 2018).
Our paper complements these studies by providing a module for ambiguity preferences. The
ambiguity preference module allows researchers to extend empirical studies on ambiguity pref-
erences to large scale field studies based on the general population. This is especially important
3in light of recent advances in theoretical models assuming ambiguity, whose predictions have
rarely been tested empirically.
Furthermore, by analysing the predictive power of the ambiguity preference module using out-
of-sample tests, this paper makes also a methodological contribution when designing preference
survey modules. While previous papers mainly concentrate on achieving a high explanatory
power of their preference modules in-sample, these modules are rarely tested on different, in-
dependent samples. By showing that our ambiguity preference module can reliably explain
ambiguity preferences for a different sample of similar size, we further substantiate the validity
of the preference module.
This paper is also related to some recent studies that measure ambiguity preferences in large
representative samples. In most of these studies, however, the ambiguity preference elicitation is
not experimentally validated. For example, Butler et al. (2014) and Bianchi and Tallon (2018)
assume that their non-incentivized Ellsberg-style thought experiments reveal true preferences.
In fact, by showing that these thought experiments are significantly correlated to ambiguity
preferences obtained in incentivized decision tasks, our study gives empirical support to their
assumptions. Studies that measure ambiguity preferences for large samples of the population
using incentivized decision tasks are rare. Four notable examples are the papers by Cohen et al.
(2011), Dimmock et al. (2015), Dimmock, Kouwenberg, Mitchell and Peijnenburg (2016) and
Dimmock, Kouwenberg and Wakker (2016). Yet, given the financial and administrative costs,
such large-scale field studies are likely to remain the exception rather than the rule.3
The remainder of the paper develops as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design
of this study, including a detailed description of the various measures of ambiguity preferences.
Next, section 3 presents the experimental results. The ambiguity preference module is derived
in section 4 together with a series of validity tests. Section 5 provides some discussion and
conclusions.
2 Experimental design
This section presents the research design, followed by a detailed description of the incentivized
tasks, hypothetical thought experiments and attitudinal questions to measure ambiguity and
risk preferences. Then we present the experimental procedure and provide a short description
of the participants.
3For example, the study by Dimmock, Kouwenberg, Mitchell and Peijnenburg (2016) paid USD 23,850 in real
incentives.
42.1 Research design
This study evaluates whether hypothetical thought experiments and attitudinal survey ques-
tions can offer a reliable alternative to measure individual ambiguity preferences as obtained in
incentivized laboratory decision tasks.
Our research design involves two parts. In the first part, we measure each subject’s ambiguity
preferences using a standard task with monetary rewards. Such incentives aim to ensure that
the subjects’ choices reveal their true preferences. The preferences obtained from the incen-
tivized task form our experimental ambiguity preference benchmark. In the second part, we
measure the subjects’ ambiguity preferences using hypothetical thought experiments and atti-
tudinal questions. Then we assess whether these measures of ambiguity preferences can reliably
predict the ambiguity preference benchmark.
It is well known that ambiguity preferences depend on many factors. For example, Curley and
Yates (1989) show that ambiguity preferences depend on the probability of the risky alternative
offered. When facing unlikely events, subjects tend to exhibit ambiguity-seeking preferences be-
cause of overweighing of low likelihood events. Furthermore, Cohen et al. (1987) show that ambi-
guity preferences are contingent on the outcome domain. When confronted with potential losses,
subjects are less ambiguity averse, or even show ambiguity-seeking preferences (Chakravarty and
Roy, 2009; Kocher et al., 2015). To minimize the impact of such factors, the incentivized task
and hypothetical thought experiments measure ambiguity preferences in the gain domain, using
non-extreme probability ranges.
This paper measures individual ambiguity preferences in the sense of the Ellsberg (1961) thought
experiment, defining ambiguity as the absence of information on exact probabilities. While there
are other sources of ambiguity (Fox and Tversky, 1995; Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Baillon et al.,
2018), the ambiguity notion in the tradition of Ellsberg is the most important ambiguity concept
in the experimental and behavioural economics literature and the paper focuses on that concept.
By considering a large set of hypothetical thought experiments and attitudinal questions, our re-
search design allows us to measure Ellsberg-type ambiguity preferences. However, it is less suited
to measure a separate aspect of decision-making under ambiguity: the tendency of subjective
overweighting (and underweighting) of extreme likelihood ambiguous events, known in the liter-
ature as a-insensitivity. This concerns the observed tendency for subjects to transform extreme
likelihoods towards un-extreme, mid-range, probabilities. The implication of a-insensitivity is
that it may lead subjects to exhibit more ambiguity-seeking behaviour for low-likelihood events
and more ambiguity-averse behaviour for high-likelihood events. While a-insensitivity is an im-
5portant issue, its separate measurement, in addition to ambiguity preferences, imposes the use
and selection of additional probability-based incentivized tasks and probability-based hypothet-
ical thought experiments for low, medium, high likelihood events.4 This would have significantly
increased the number of probability-based tasks relative to the others and increased the duration
of the experiment. To avoid introducing an overly complicated design with many probability-
based tasks by construction, we use non-extreme probability ranges at the cost of being unable
to elicit a-insensitivity.5
2.2 Incentivized tasks
The literature has proposed many different designs to measure ambiguity preferences.6 We
rely on the well-established design to measure ambiguity preferences using binary choice lists
between risky and ambiguous lotteries. The lotteries are presented in the form of two-colour
urns, similar to Ellsberg (1961). Binary choice lists are considered easier to understand than the
BDM mechanism (Becker et al., 1964), and are thus likely to result in more precise estimates of
ambiguity preferences.
The ambiguity preference task presents subjects with a decision table with 11 choices between
drawing a ball from either a risky or an ambiguous urn. The composition and payoff structure
of the ambiguous urn is identical in all 11 situations. In contrast, the expected payoff of the
risky urn increases from one situation to the next. This change is induced by increasing the
probability of winning some prize, while leaving the potential prize constant. The task has
been implemented in student and non-student samples as early as by Lauriola and Levin (2001).
As Dimmock et al. (2015) show, this particular design allows measuring ambiguity preference
independent of the subject’s utility function, and thus risk preferences. The point at which
subjects switch from preferring the ambiguous urn over the risky urn reveals their ambiguity
preferences.7
To verify that ambiguity preferences are distinct from risk preferences, we also include a task
to elicit risk preferences. We use a standard multiple choice list, taken from Chakravarty and
4One example is the design by Dimmock, Kouwenberg and Wakker (2016) who use three sets of incentivized
dynamic choice tasks to elicit ambiguity preferences for three different levels of ambiguity. They show that
a-insensitivity is related to financial behaviour.
5In our considerations, there was also a trade-off between the duration of the experiment (and the incentives
paid) and the number of participants our budget allowed.
6For a review, see Camerer and Weber (1992), Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2016), and Carbone et al.
(2017).
7We also considered measuring ambiguity preferences using a binary choice list where the expected payoff of
the risky urn changes by monotonically decreasing its prize (but not its probability), see for example Chakravarty
and Roy (2009). However, in such a setting the switching point depends on the subjects’ risk preferences. Although
it is possible to first estimate risk preferences, such a procedure increases the overall measurement error of the
estimated ambiguity preferences.
6Roy (2009) that proved intelligible in the piloting phase. In this task, subjects are presented a
decision table with 10 choices between drawing a ball from a low-risk urn and high-risk urn. As
the list proceeds, the low-risk urn remains identical while the expected payoff from the high-risk
urn increases monotonically. The point at which subjects switch from the low-risk urn to the
high-risk urn reveals information on subject risk preferences. Both tasks are reproduced in the
online appendix A.
2.3 Hypothetical thought experiments
Following Ellsberg (1961), the literature has proposed a large variety of hypothetical thought
experiments to measure ambiguity preferences. Non-incentivized elicitation methods have the
advantage of lower costs and reduced complexity, thereby reducing the time needed to measure
preferences. In this study, we implement two common thought experiments to measure ambiguity
preferences:8
i. The first thought experiment replicates the seminal two-colour Ellsberg (1961) urn experi-
ment. Following Butler et al. (2014), subjects are offered five answer possibilities to allow
differentiating between different degrees of ambiguity preferences.
ii. Second, we design a dynamic version of the Ellsberg (1961) two-colour thought experiment.
Subjects are presented four (in some cases five) sequential choices between drawing a ball
from a risky or an ambiguous urn. Depending on prior choices, the composition of the risky
urn is made more or less attractive from one situation to the next, converging to a point of
(approximate) indifference between both urns. This gives a matching probability similar to
the incentivized ambiguity task.9
Online appendix B presents the two thought experiments in detail.
2.4 Attitudinal survey questions
While using survey questions to measure risk preferences is common (Guiso and Paiella, 2008;
Dohmen et al., 2011), there is yet no study in economics that explicitly uses questionnaires to
measure ambiguity preferences. We hence resort to survey questions from validated self-reported
attitudinal scales in the psychology literature on ambiguity (in)tolerance. In these scales subjects
8Any incentivized task can be transformed into a non-incentivized task by removing the monetary incentives.
However, the complexity remains higher than in usual thought experiments.
9Similar path dependent designs are used in Baillon et al. (2012), Baillon and Bleichrodt (2015), Dimmock
et al. (2015) and Dimmock, Kouwenberg, Mitchell and Peijnenburg (2016).
7are asked to indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with a list of statements on a
scale from 1 to 7.
The concept of ambiguity (in)tolerance used in psychology is more general than in economics.
While it comprises the typical notion of aversion to vague outcome probabilities, the concept also
refers to aversion to novelty, complexity and insolubility (Budner, 1962). Aversion to situations
with unclear structure (e.g., where there is no clear solution) is an indication of aversion to
ambiguity. For example, the scales contain statements such as “Practically every problem has a
solution”.
We implement the Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale by Kirton (1981), one of the most widely used
and renowned scales on ambiguity attitudes in psychology.10 In addition, we include selected
items from more recent scales, like the Ambiguity Tolerance scales (Budner, 1962; Norton, 1975;
McLain, 2009) and the Uncertainty Response Scale by Greco and Roger (2001) that correspond to
the notion of ambiguity as absence of exact probabilities used in the economics literature. Since it
has been argued that ambiguity attitudes are related to optimism and pessimism (Chateauneuf
et al., 2007) and self-esteem (Heath and Tversky, 1991), we include attitudinal questions on
optimism/pessimism from the Extended Life Orientation test by Chang et al. (1997) and a self-
esteem measure by Robins et al. (2001). Together with some of our own additions, the survey
questionnaire contains 46 attitudinal questions in total. The complete list is included in the
online appendix C.
2.5 Experimental procedure
The experiment was conducted in May and October 2013 at Birkbeck College, University of
London. The laboratory sessions were implemented in z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Each session
consisted of four parts. The first part included the attitudinal questionnaire as described in
section 2.4. The hypothetical thought experiments (see section 2.3) followed in part 2. The
third part included a standard demographic questionnaire. Finally, the last section consisted of
the incentivized tasks, see section 2.2. The first task was the risk task, followed by the ambiguity
task.
This particular sequence was chosen to reduce potential spill-over effects between the four parts.
More precisely, subjects’ answers in one part might be influenced by answers in previous parts
– for example in an attempt to be consistent.11 However, because of monetary incentives, we
10Kirton (1981) is widely used in empirical work in social psychology. For a review, see Furnham and Ribchester
(1995). The scale develops from earlier works by Budner (1962), Rydell and Rosen (1966) and Mac Donald Jr.
(1970).
11For example, individuals aim to be consistent in order to avoid cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Falk
8expected choices in the decision tasks to be uninfluenced by non-incentivised thought experiments
and attitudinal questions. Hence, placing the incentivized decision tasks at the end minimises
potential spill-over effects across parts. In two pilot sessions we reversed the order to test for
order effects, and found none.
In the ambiguity tasks, participants were asked to select the colour of the winning ball. This
ensures that subjects had no reason to believe that the experimenter had any strategic incentive
to manipulate the colour of the balls in the ambiguous urn (Chow and Sarin, 2002; Charness
et al., 2013).
The payment modality of the incentivised tasks was common knowledge. Subjects were informed
that one situation from each task would be randomly selected by the computer at the end of the
session. Then the computer would randomly draw one ball from the urn chosen. This procedure
ensures that subjects state their true preferences.12 Earnings from the tasks were calculated in
terms of points, and then converted at a rate of 2:1 into GBP. On average, subjects earned GBP
18.45, which includes a fixed show-up fee of GBP 10.13 Earnings were paid in private at the end
of the sessions.
2.6 Participants
There were 121 participants in the study, all of them students of three University of London
colleges. The participants were recruited via electronic mail and announcements at the beginning
of graduate and undergraduate lectures of various study programmes. The sample contains 54
(45%) male and 67 (55%) female subjects, with an average age of about 26 years. The sample
of participants predominantly came from Birkbeck College (University of London) which has a
professional and international student population. This gives the sample more variability than
that usually observed in experimental subject pools of undergraduate students. For example,
almost a fifth of the subject sample is older then 30. For the detailed sample statistics see the
online appendix D.
and Zimmermann, 2017).
12In a recent paper, Bade (2015) presents some problems with this random incentive mechanism when subjects
are ambiguity averse. Yet, to our knowledge, the random incentive mechanism remains the best incentive scheme
to measure ambiguity preferences and it is commonplace in laboratory and field studies.
13The lowest payment was GBP 10, the highest payment GBP 26. Since the sessions lasted for about 40
minutes, the payoffs are sizable.
93 Experimental results
3.1 Ambiguity task
Table 1 presents the subjects’ choices between drawing a ball from the risky or the ambiguous
urn in the incentivized ambiguity task. In around 55% of the situations, subjects prefer drawing
a ball from the risky urn over drawing a ball from the ambiguous urn. In binary choice lists, a
typical strategy is a threshold strategy. Since the relative attractiveness of the lotteries changes
monotonically from situation to situation, many participants prefer one urn over the other up
to a switching point, from which they prefer the other urn. Since there is no chance of winning
anything in the risky urn (urn 1) in situation 0, the ambiguous urn (urn 2) is the natural
choice. However, as the probability of winning a prize in the risky urn increases, it becomes
more attractive.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of incentivized ambiguity task
Panel A: Choices and switching points
Risky choices Switching point Switching point
(consistent DMs)
Risky choices Obs. Fraction Switching point Obs. Fraction Switching point Obs. Fraction
0/11 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0%
1/11 0 0.0% 1 0 0.0% 1 0 0.0%
2/11 0 0.0% 2 2 1.7% 2 2 1.7%
3/11 0 0.0% 3 9 7.4% 3 8 6.9%
4/11 7 5.8% 4 28 23.1% 4 27 23.3%
5/11 26 21.5% 5 49 40.5% 5 48 41.4%
6/11 50 41.3% 6 25 21.5% 6 25 21.6%
7/11 28 23.1% 7 6 5.0% 7 6 5.2%
8/11 8 6.6% 8 1 0.8% 8 0 0.0%
9 /11 2 1.7% 9 0 0.0% 9 0 0.0%
10/11 0 0.0% 10 0 0.0% 10 0 0.0%
11/11 0 0.0% 11 0 0.0% 11 0 0.0%
Total 121 100.0% Total 121 100.0% Total 116 100.0%
Panel B: Summary statistics
Observations Mean Standard deviation Lowest Highest
Risky choices 121 55.3% 0.10% 36.4% 81.8%
Switching point 121 4.91 1.08 2 8
Switching point (consistent DMs) 116 4.90 1.04 2 7
The table summarizes the results of incentivized ambiguity task. In panel A, the three columns on the left report
the number of situations where subjects preferred drawing a ball from the risky urn (urn 1) over drawing a ball
from the ambiguous urn (urn 2). The columns on the right report the switching points of the subjects. More
precisely, it indicates the last situation before a subject switches from the ambiguous urn (urn 2) to the risky urn
(urn 1). Five subjects exhibit multiple switching points, i.e., they display inconsistent choices. In this case, we
calculate the average switching point. The three columns on the right exclude these inconsistent decision makers.
Panel B presents the summary statistics of the fraction of risky choices and the switching points. For a detailed
description of the task, see online appendix A.
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Yet, subjects may switch from one choice to the other more than once. This behaviour is difficult
to reconcile with standard preference models under ambiguity. The percentage of subjects that
switch more than once is fairly small at around 4%, in line with the study on risk preferences
by Holt and Laury (2002).
The columns on the right of table 1 present the switching points of the subjects, i.e., the last
situation before a subject switches from the ambiguous urn (urn 2) to the risky urn (urn 1).
In case a subject exhibits multiple switching points, we follow Falk et al. (2016) and calculate
the subject’s average switching point. Since multiple switching pointy may indicate a misappre-
hension of the task, we also present the switching points for the sample of consistent decision
makers.
3.2 Risk task
Table 2 summarizes the results from the risk task. In about 56% of the situations, subjects
prefer drawing a ball from the relatively safe urn over drawing a ball from the very risky urn.
Again, the large majority of subjects (95%) exhibits a threshold strategy. Since the expected
earnings of the risky urn are zero in situation 0, all subjects prefer the safe urn. As the relative
attractiveness of the risky lottery increases monotonically from situation to situation, many
subjects switch at some stage to the risky urn. In case a subject exhibits multiple switching
points, we again calculate the subject’s average switching point. The two columns on the right
present the switching points for all decision makers and consistent decision makers separately.
3.3 Ambiguity preference benchmark
This section derives the experimental ambiguity preference benchmark from the switching points
of the incentivized ambiguity task. Following Dimmock et al. (2015), we use the subject’s so-
called matching probability (or risk equivalent) as the ambiguity preference benchmark. The
matching probability m is defined as the subjective probability at which a subject is indifferent
between a risky and the ambiguous lottery. If m < 0.5, a subject is ambiguity-averse; if m > 0.5
a subject is ambiguity-seeking.14
We construct a subject’s matching probability from the switching point in the incentivized
ambiguity task. Since the probability of winning a prize in the risky urn increases in 10% steps,
14Because of symmetry of the two colours and an implicitly assumed exchangeability condition (Chew and
Sagi, 2006), a matching probability of 0.5 is the subjective probability of an ambiguity-neutral decision maker.
From this, it follows that a matching probability larger than 0.5 corresponds to ambiguity seeking preferences,
and that a matching probability smaller than 0.5 corresponds to ambiguity averse preferences. See Dimmock et al.
(2015) for a theoretical derivation.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of incentivized risk task
Panel A: Choices and switching points
Choices Switching point Switching point
(consistent DMs)
Safe choices Obs. Fraction Switching point Obs. Fraction Switching point Obs. Fraction
0/10 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0%
1/10 1 0.8% 1 1 0.8% 1 1 0.8%
2/10 1 0.8% 2 1 0.8% 2 1 0.8%
3/10 4 3.3% 3 4 3.3% 3 4 3.5%
4/10 23 19.0% 4 23 19.0% 4 23 20.0%
5/10 36 29.8% 5 37 30.6% 5 34 29.6%
6/10 22 18.2% 6 21 17.4% 6 19 16.5%
7/10 18 14.9% 7 18 14.9% 7 18 15.7%
8/10 10 8.3% 8 10 8.3% 8 9 7.8%
9/10 2 1.7% 9 2 1.7% 9 2 1.7%
10/10 4 3.3% 10 4 3.3% 10 4 3.5%
Total 121 100.0% Total 121 100.0% Total 115 100.0%
Panel B: Summary statistics
Observations Mean Standard deviation Lowest Highest
Save choices 121 56.4% 0.17% 10% 100%
Switching point 121 5.64 1.66 1 10
Switching point 115 5.63 1.68 1 10
The table summarizes the results of incentivized risk task. In panel A, the three columns on the left report the
number of situations where subjects preferred drawing a ball from the safe urn (urn A) over drawing a ball from
the risky urn (urn B). The columns on the right report the switching points of the subjects. More precisely, it
indicates the last situation before a subject switched from the safe urn (urn A) to the risky urn (urn B). Six
subjects exhibit multiple switching points, i.e., they display inconsistent choices. In this case, we calculate the
average switching point. The three columns on the right exclude these inconsistent decision makers. A switching
point of 0 means that the subject always preferred the risky urn; a switching point of 10 means that the subject
always preferred the safe urn. Panel B presents the summary statistics of the fraction of safe choices and the
switching points. For a detailed description of the task, see online appendix A.
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Table 3: Ambiguity preference benchmark
Panel A: Ambiguity preference benchmark (m)
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
All subjects 121 0.441 0.108 0.15 0.75
Only consistent DMs 116 0.440 0.104 0.15 0.65
Panel B: Distribution of ambiguity preferences
Groups Ambiguity Ambiguity Ambiguity
seeking neutral averse
All subjects 2 27% – 73%
3 6% 62% 32%
Only consistent DMs 2 27% – 73%
3 5% 63% 32%
Panel C: Correlation between benchmark, socio-demographic characteristics and risk preferences
Rank correlation p-value
Female −0.052 0.568
Age 0.078 0.396
Education of mother 0.003 0.973
Risk aversion 0.070 0.448
The table presents the ambiguity preferences of the incentivized task as measured by the subject’s matching
probability m (or risk equivalent). Panel A reports the descriptive statistics. Panel B describes the distribution
of ambiguity preferences when classifying subjects in two or three ambiguity preference groups. The upper row
uses a binary classification that distinguishes between ambiguity seeking (m > 0.5) and ambiguity averse decision
makers (m < 0.5). The lower row presents the results based on a classification into three groups, including
ambiguity neutrality, where ambiguity neutrality is defined as m ∈ [0.45, 0.55]. Panel C presents the Spearman
rank correlation between the ambiguity preference benchmark, selected socio-economic characteristics and an
experimental measure of risk aversion. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
the task only allows us to determine a subject’s matching probability up to intervals of 10%.
We therefore define the matching probability as the mid-point of these intervals. For example,
if a subject’s switching point is 5 (i.e., preferring urn 2 up to situation 5 and then switching to
urn 1), then the matching probability is between 50% and 60%. We therefore assign a matching
probability of 55%.
Panel A of table 3 presents the summary statistics of the preference benchmark for the entire
sample and the sample of consistent subjects. The average matching probability is around 0.44,
which corresponds to ambiguity-averse preferences, on average.15
Panel B presents the distribution of ambiguity preferences when classifying subjects in two or
three ambiguity preference groups. The upper row uses a binary classification that distinguishes
between ambiguity seeking (m > 0.5) and ambiguity averse decision makers (m < 0.5). The
15This is similar to Dimmock, Kouwenberg and Wakker (2016) and Dimmock, Kouwenberg, Mitchell and
Peijnenburg (2016), which document an average matching probability of 0.40 and 0.48, respectively.
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lower row presents the results based on a classification into three groups, including ambiguity
neutrality, where ambiguity neutrality is defined as m ∈ [0.45, 0.55].16 The benchmark classifies
73% of subjects as ambiguity averse using a binary segmentation of preferences. However, a
classification in three preference categories shows that almost two thirds of the sample can be
considered ambiguity neutral.
Panel C presents the Spearman rank correlation between the ambiguity preference benchmark
and several socio-economic characteristics. Like Binmore et al. (2012) and Dimmock et al. (2015),
we do not find any gender differences in ambiguity preferences, nor an effect of the educational
background or age. Finally, we replicate the standard result that ambiguity preferences are
distinct from risk preferences.
3.4 Thought experiments
Table 4 analyses the results from the two thought experiments. Panel A shows that in the
Ellsberg (1961) thought experiment with five answer possibilities, 64% of subjects are ambi-
guity averse, 28% are ambiguity seeking and 8% ambiguity neutral. In the dynamic Ellsberg
urn experiment, we transform the subjects’ choices into a matching probability, similar to the
incentivized ambiguity task. More precisely, after the last choice, a subject’s matching proba-
bility is narrowed down to a small interval. As before, we define the matching probability as the
mid-point of that interval. Panel B shows that the average matching probability is 44%. This
is remarkably similar to the ambiguity preference benchmark, and consistent with the notion of
ambiguity aversion.17
Panel C presents the distribution of subjects into two or three broad ambiguity preference groups,
similar to panel B of table 3. Yet, since the Ellsberg thought experiment explicitly allows for
ambiguity neutrality, it is not possible to apply a binary classification for this elicitation method.
When using a binary classification, most subjects are ambiguity averse. However, like in the
incentivized task, there is a substantial fraction of ambiguity-neutral decision makers.
Panels D and E compare the ambiguity preferences obtained from the thought experiments
to the benchmark. With 27%, the dynamic Ellsberg urn exhibits the highest rank correlation
with the benchmark. The classic Ellsberg urn experiment correlates to 19% with the ambiguity
preference benchmark. This lower correlation is likely to result from the significantly fewer
answer possibilities, and hence cross-sectional variation, in this thought experiment.
16If a subject is ambiguity neutral (m = 0.5), then he is indifferent between switching after situation 4 or 5,
which corresponds to an estimated matching probability of 0.45 or 0.55.
17In both thought experiments, the majority of subjects is ambiguity averse (p < 0.01, binomial probability
test).
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Table 4: Non-incentivized thought experiments
Panel A: Ellsberg (1961) urn
Observations Fraction
Strong preference for ambiguous urn 12 9.9%
Slight preference for ambiguous urn 22 18.2%
Indifferent between both urns 10 8.3%
Slight preference for risky urn 40 33.1%
Strong preference for risky urn 37 30.6%
Total 121 100.0%
Panel B: Dynamic Ellsberg urn
Matching probability Observations Fraction
2.5% 1 0.8%
12.5% 4 3.3%
22.5% 5 4.1%
27.5% 5 4.1%
32.5% 11 9.1%
37.5% 25 20.7%
42.5% 6 5.0%
47.5% 20 16.5%
52.5% 27 22.3%
57.5% 10 8.3%
62.5% 1 0.8%
67.5% 2 1.7%
72.5% 2 1.7%
77.5% 1 0.8%
95% 1 0.8%
Total 121 100.0%
Mean Standard deviation
Matching probability 43.9% 13.8%
Panel C: Distribution of ambiguity preferences
Elicitation method Groups Ambiguity Ambiguity Ambiguity
seeking neutral averse
Ellsberg (1961) urn 2 – – –
3 28% 8% 64%
Dynamic Ellsberg urn 2 36% – 64%
3 14% 39% 47%
Panel D: Correlation between ambiguity preferences and non-incentivized tasks
Elicitation method Rank correlation p-value
Ellsberg (1961) urn 0.186∗∗ 0.041
Dynamic Ellsberg urn 0.268∗∗∗ 0.003
Panel E: Individual consistency of ambiguity preferences and non-incentivized tasks
Elicitation method Consistent Difference from Test of
preferences independent distribution association
Ellsberg (1961) urn 35% 7.45%∗
Dynamic Ellsberg urn 53% 12.8%∗∗∗ ***
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Annotation to table 4
The table summarizes the results of the two non-incentivized thought experiments. Panels A and B present the
descriptive statistics. Panel C describes the distribution of ambiguity preferences when classifying subjects in
two/three broad ambiguity preference groups, similar to table 3. Since the Ellsberg thought experiment explicitly
allows for ambiguity neutrality, it has been excluded from the binary classification. Panel D presents the Spearman
rank correlation between the ambiguity preference benchmark and the ambiguity preferences obtained from the
non-incentivized tasks. Panel E reports the individual consistency of the estimated ambiguity preferences when
classifying subjects into three broad ambiguity preferences groups. The first column presents the fraction of indi-
vidually consistent preferences, i.e., subjects that exhibit the same ambiguity attitude in the thought experiments
and the ambiguity preference benchmark. The second column presents the difference of the observed consistency
compared to the fraction of individually consistent preferences that one would observe if the ambiguity measures
were independently distributed. The last column shows the statistical significance of a two-sided Fisher test of
association between each pair of ambiguity preferences. For a detailed description of the thought experiments,
see online appendix B.
Panel E presents an analysis of the subjects’ within-person consistency of the ambiguity pref-
erences obtained from the two thought experiments relative to the ambiguity preference bench-
mark. More precisely, the panel presents the fraction of subjects that exhibit the same ambiguity
attitude in the thought experiments as in the ambiguity preference benchmark. This analysis
shows that the dynamic Ellsberg thought experiment performs rather well in classifying subjects
similar to the benchmark (53% of the subjects), which is significantly higher than the fraction
of consistent preferences one would observe if the preferences were independently distributed.
4 Ambiguity preference module
This section examines whether thought experiments and attitudinal questions can be used to pre-
dict ambiguity preferences. We identify a set of thought experiments and attitudinal questions
that best predict the ambiguity preference benchmark (section 4.1) and propose an ambiguity
preference survey module that reliably measures ambiguity preferences when laboratory exper-
iments are not feasible (section 4.2). We then test the validity of the module (section 4.3) and
propose a ready-to-use ambiguity preference module for applied work (section 4.4).
4.1 Item selection procedure
The construction of the ambiguity preference survey module faces the challenge of finding the
optimal trade-off between parsimony and a sufficiently high explanatory power of ambiguity
preferences. To determine the items that best proxy for ambiguity preferences, we follow a
procedure inspired by Falk et al. (2016). The rationale of this procedure is to make as few
a-priori assumptions as possible in regards to the item selection and let the selection be data
driven.
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This procedure consists of two steps. First, for a given number of predictors, we estimate
linear regression models for all possible combinations of predictors. Considering all possible
combinations of thought experiments and attitudinal questions on an equal basis avoids imposing
arbitrary selections and takes into account all possible correlation patterns among the predictors.
Then we select the set of predictors that maximize the explained variation of the ambiguity
preference benchmark, i.e. the R2. Evaluating the predictive power for a given number of
predictors is useful for practical purposes since survey data collection often imposes space and
time constraints. In the second step, we use standard information criteria to select the best
specification out of the models chosen in the first step. In an attempt to avoid over-fitting
the data and identifying a concise preference module, we resort to the Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC), since it contains a larger penalty for additional explanatory variables relative
to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) or the adjusted R2.18
4.2 The ambiguity preference module
Table 5 presents the selected items for a given number of predictors up to the specification
with the lowest overall BIC. Panel A reports the regressions when using all decision makers;
panel B reports the regressions when considering the subset of consistent decision makers only.
Predictors measured on Likert scales (e.g., survey questions) are coded as binary indicators
(equal to 1 if the response value indicates agreement with an ambiguity tolerant statement and
equal to 0 otherwise), using the median respondent value in the sample as the threshold for the
classification. The estimated coefficients on the binary indicators (multiplied by 100) estimate
the differential in terms of risk equivalent (i.e. percentage point differential) between ambiguity
tolerant and ambiguity averse people.19 Predictors measured as continuous variables are treated
as continuous variables.20 Column (1) of table 5 shows the best predictor (in terms of R2) when
18The choice set of alternative item selection procedures is vast. Alternatives vary along the dimensions of i) the
selection procedure; ii) the goodness of fit statistics used; iii) the specification used in the iteration. Alternative
selection procedures in (i) include stepwise forward selection, stepwise backward selection, or the Lasso technique
by Tibshirani (1996). Each of these techniques has considerable drawbacks that make them unsuitable for our
purpose. For a critical discussion on these alternative selection procedures see Falk et al. (2016), footnote 13.
Alternatives in (ii) include the BIC (which we use), the adjusted R2, AIC or the Mean Squared Error. These
statistics apply different penalties for the estimation of additional parameters. Alternatives in (iii) include non-
linear functional forms.
19In order to classify responses into binary indicators (i.e. ambiguity tolerant/intolerant), we use the sample
median value for each survey question to take into account the distribution of sample responses. Some of the survey
question responses have skewed distributions. This is likely to be due to the composition of our subject sample:
students. For example, the majority of young people agree to the statement “I would like to live in a foreign
country new to me.” While the use of the sample median is not indispensable, it creates relative classifications
within sample.
20Two alternative specifications are possible. A more flexible approach would be to implement a fully non-
parametric specification with a binary indicator for each value of the rating scales (=1 if that value is chosen, =0
otherwise). The advantage of this approach is to allow for a flexible, non-linear, pattern of predictors’ correlations
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using one predictor; column (2) shows the two best predictors when using two predictors, and
so on.
For both samples, the best single predictor is the dynamic Ellsberg thought experiment, which
alone explains about 5% of the variation in the ambiguity preference benchmark. In fact, this
hypothetical thought experiment is very similar in spirit to the hypothetical thought experiment
used to measure risk preferences in the streamlined version of the preference module by Falk
et al. (2016).
When using the entire sample of 121 subjects (panel A), the best specification in terms of BIC
contains five explanatory variables, including the dynamic Ellsberg thought experiment and four
survey questions. Together, these items explain about 21% of the variation in ambiguity prefer-
ences. When restricting to the sample of 116 consistent subjects (panel B), the best specification
(in terms of BIC) includes three predictors, the dynamic Ellsberg thought experiment and two
survey questions, a subset of the items selected of the entire data sample. These three predictors
achieve an R2 of about 12%. The explanatory power of both sets of models is comparable to
those of risk preferences reported by Falk et al. (2016).
Table 6 presents the exact wording of the ambiguity preference modules for both samples.21
It makes sense that the dynamic Ellsberg thought experiment is the best single-item predictor
of ambiguity preferences: it has a similar framing as the incentivised task and by producing
a finer measurement classification, it provides more explanatory power than qualitative tasks
with coarser classifications. In terms of the attitudinal questions, survey items 1 and 2 are part
of the Kirton (1981) Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale. Survey items 35 and 41 are taken from
the uncertainty response scale by Greco and Roger (2001) and the ambiguity tolerance scale II
(McLain, 2009). The former two survey items capture the aversion to complexity and unclear
structure, the latter two statements capture the aversion to uncertain outcomes.
By having identified that a dynamic Ellsberg thought experiment is a good predictor of ambi-
guity preferences, the module gives confidence in the measurement validity of probability-based
with the ambiguity benchmark. As we measured the survey item predictors on 7-point Likert scales, this approach
would imply estimating 6 parameters for each ordinal predictor. Given our sample size, such an approach would
be inappropriate as we would run out of degrees of freedom quickly. However, the fully non-parametric approach
would be advisable for future studies with larger samples. A second alternative approach is to treat rating scales
as continuous variables. This approach relies on the assumption of linearity, which may, but need not, be satisfied.
As a robustness test, we run auxiliary regressions to test the linearity assumption in our sample and we conclude
that the linearity assumption cannot be rejected for the items selected. These tests are available in the online
appendix E.
21This result shows that the dynamic Ellsberg thought experiment is a better predictor relative to the static
two-colour Ellsberg thought experiment. This does not mean that the Ellsberg thought experiment is not a good
proxy, but that the dynamic Ellsberg thought experiment explains more variation in the benchmark. Indeed,
the static Ellsberg thought experiment is significantly correlated with ambiguity preferences in pairwise tests (see
table 4). This provides a validation to existing applications of the static Ellsberg thought experiment, e.g., Butler
et al. (2014).
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Table 5: Predicting the ambiguity preference benchmark
Panel A: All subjects
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
best
Dynamic Ellsberg urn 0.0017** 0.0017** 0.0019*** 0.0021*** 0.0023***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Item 19 -0.0392**
(0.019)
Item 1 0.0501** 0.0545*** 0.0485**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Item 2 0.0501** 0.0524*** 0.0488**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Item 35 0.0276 0.0402*
(0.021) (0.021)
Item 41 -0.0425**
(0.020)
constant 0.3655*** 0.3883*** 0.3099*** 0.2883*** 0.2993***
(0.032) (0.034) (0.036) (0.040) (0.039)
BIC from selection procedure −192.54 −192.05 −195.26 −194.66 −195.91
R2 from selection procedure 4.8% 8.1% 14.0% 16.9% 20.9%
Observations 121 121 121 121 121
Panel B: Consistent subjects
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3)
best
Item 19 -0.0391** -0.0398**
(0.019) (0.019)
Dynamic Ellsberg urn 0.0015** 0.0016**
(0.001) (0.001)
Item 1 0.0387*
(0.020)
Item 2 0.0520***
(0.020)
constant 0.4622*** 0.3969*** 0.3269***
(0.015) (0.033) (0.036)
BIC from selection procedure −191.64 −191.46 −192.31
R2 from selection procedure 3.8% 7.6% 11.9%
Observations 116 116 116
The table presents regressions of the ambiguity preference benchmark (m) on the preferences obtained from non-
incentivized thought experiments and the attitudinal questions. In section 4.1, we estimate linear regression models
for all possible combinations of predictors. The table above reports the specifications with the highest adjusted
R2 for a given number of predictors up to the specification with the lowest overall BIC (the optimal specification).
BIC and R2 statistics of these specifications are reported in the bottom rows of each panel. Predictors measured
on Likert scales (i.e., the survey questions, indicated with the term ‘Item’) are coded as binary indicators (equal
to 1 if the response value indicates agreement with an ambiguity tolerant statement and equal to 0 otherwise),
using the median respondent value in the sample as the threshold for the classification. Panel A reports the
regressions when using all decision makers; panel B reports the regressions when only considering consistent
decision makers. T-statistics are given in the parentheses below the estimated coefficients. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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thought experiments with medium range probabilities. Further research may build on this result
and introduce variations in the levels of ambiguity to measure secondary elements of ambiguity
attitudes, like a-insensitivity, in large surveys.
4.3 Tests of the ambiguity preference module
4.3.1 In-sample tests
As a first assessment of the quality of the ambiguity preference module, we analyse the module’s
in-sample fit, i.e., the degree to which the module captures the variation in ambiguity preferences.
To this end, we calculate the in-sample correlation between the predicted ambiguity preferences
using the preference module and the ambiguity preference benchmark. The predicted ambiguity
preferences are calculated as the fitted values of the regressions. Depending on the length of the
preference module, the correlations range between 22% for the single-item module up to 41%
for the 5-predictor module, see the second column of table 6. These correlations are sizable, and
highly significant. They are also comparable to the magnitudes found in similar studies on risk
preferences (Falk et al., 2016).
4.3.2 Out-of-sample tests
While the in-sample fit is an important criterion to assess a module’s ability to capture the
subjects’ preferences, it is not free from limitations. Most importantly, adding more predictors
to the module always improves the explanatory power in-sample, but can worsen the module’s
ability to predict preferences for another subject pool (over fitting). Hence, a more important
test of any preference module is not the in-sample fit, but its accuracy in predicting preferences
out of sample.
To analyse the predictive power of the ambiguity preference module out of sample, we replicate
the incentivized tasks and the entire ambiguity preference module on a completely different pool
of subjects. This second round of experiments was conducted in March 2016 at the ExpReSS
Lab at Royal Holloway, University of London.22 We call this the second sample.
With 99 subjects, the second sample is almost of equal size as the original data sample. Relative
to the original sample, the average age of participants is significantly younger (18.3 years) and
has a larger fraction of female participants (75%). The diversity in subject characteristics makes
the out-of-sample results an even stricter test.
The procedure of the out-of-sample test is as follows. First, we predict ambiguity preferences
22The experimental procedure of this second round of experiments is identical to those described in section 2.
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of the second sample of subjects using their answers to the items included in the preference
modules identified in the item selection procedure (and listed in panel A and B in table 6).
We use the coefficient estimates in table 5 to predict the second sample subjects’ ambiguity
preferences. Then, we correlate the predicted ambiguity preferences with the actual ambiguity
preference benchmark elicited for the second sample of subjects.
The results are presented in the right column of table 6. Depending on the module, the out-of-
sample correlations between predicted and actual ambiguity preferences are between 26% and
33%, and in most cases highly significant. Again, these correlations are comparable to those of
risk preferences in Falk et al. (2016).
With the exception of the single-item module, the out-of-sample correlation is lower than the in-
sample correlation. This is expected, since the module coefficients are obtained from a completely
different data set. Yet, the dynamic Ellsberg urn thought experiment is even better in predicting
ambiguity preferences out-of-sample than in-sample. This further underlines the reliability of
this module item in measuring ambiguity preferences.
4.3.3 Test-retest
The in-sample and out-of-sample correlations are statistically significant. However, to judge
whether their magnitudes are sizeable and relevant in economic terms, one needs a benchmark
correlation (i.e. the maximum correlation that can be achieved). It is not reasonable to expect a
100% correlation between ambiguity preferences and the preference module because any measure
of preferences has in practice some unavoidable measurement error.
This implies that even if the module measured ambiguity preferences equally well as the in-
centivized task, the correlation will be less than one because of measurement errors. What
correlation can one reasonably expect? A reasonable benchmark is the one offered by a test-
retest procedure, also adopted in Falk et al. (2016): let the same subject answer the same task
twice. The benchmark correlation is the level of correlation between the first and second answer.
The underlying idea is that when measuring ambiguity preferences for the same subject twice,
one should obtain the maximum level of achievable correlation netted by the measurement error.
This correlation is going to be a reasonable benchmark against which to assess in-sample and
out-of-sample correlations.
We implement the test-retest procedure on the incentivized tasks using a sub-sample of 26
subjects who participated in the study twice, with a time lag of 5 months. This gives us two
measures of ambiguity preferences elicited in an identical way. The test-retest correlation is
obtained by correlating the first observation of the subjects’ ambiguity preference benchmark
22
with their second observation.
The test-retest correlation is 32.9%, with a p-value of 0.101, i.e., close to significant at the 10%
level. The rank correlation is 38.6%, with a p-value of 0.059. This correlation is comparable
to the test-retest of risk preferences in Falk et al. (2016). More importantly, the test-retest
correlation is close to the in-sample and out-of-sample correlation between preference benchmark
and ambiguity preference module (see table 6). Hence, the ambiguity preference module can be
considered sufficiently reliable.
4.4 Ambiguity preference score
The ambiguity preference module is easily implementable in all kinds of surveys, including phone-
based surveys. Answering the preference module takes less than 5 minutes. In this section, we
give two suggestions to create a ready-to-use ambiguity preference score from the responses to
the module for empirical applications. The section assumes that a researcher collects responses
using the ‘best’ version of the module as presented in column (5) of table 5, panel A, and wants
to combine the data in some ways to obtain a unified score (or index) of ambiguity preferences
without having access to incentivized preference measures.
There are several ways to combine the survey module responses. The main challenge is to convert
the survey questions (measured on Likert scales) into a unit of measurement comparable to the
dynamic Ellsberg thought experiment, such that they can be aggregated. One way to do that
is to use the coefficients in table 5 (panel A) to construct this conversion metric. Note that
the coefficients associated with the survey questions are similar: they indicate, on average, a
differential in ambiguity preferences of 0.045 based on the answers to the survey questions. This
differential can be made comparable to a one unit change in the dynamic Ellsberg (one percentage
point) by dividing this number by the coefficient of the Ellsberg thought experiment. The same
applies to the constant. The resulting equivalence for each survey question is 20 units (rounded
at the next integer) and 130 for the constant. Thus, if a subject is classified as ambiguity tolerant
based on a survey question, she receives ±20 points, according to the sign of the coefficient in
table 5, 130 for the constant and the numerical value of her answer to the Ellsberg thought
experiment (in percent).23 A low ambiguity preference score corresponds to ambiguity-averse
preferences; a high ambiguity score corresponds to ambiguity-seeking preferences.
We want to point out that these estimates are based on the median responses of our sample
and we should not ignore the possibility that different samples behave differently. One way
23As an example, suppose a subject reveals in the dynamic Ellsberg urn experiment a matching probability of
37.5% and answers all 4 survey questions with values revealing ambiguity tolerant attitudes. Then the ambiguity
preference score equals 37.5 +20 +20 +20 - 20 + 130 = 207.5.
23
to standardize the conversion is to attribute an equivalence to each value of the Likert scale.
This method yields a score that has the advantage of being median response-invariant and
comparable across different samples. To calculate this equivalence, we recover the coefficients
associated with one unit change in the Likert scales by re-running the regression specification
(5) in table 5 panel A treating the answers to the Likert scales as continuous variables. This
approach also allows for more variation in ambiguity preferences across subjects. The average
absolute value of the coefficients of the survey questions is 0.01767 and the constant is 0.350.
Dividing these numbers by the coefficient of the Ellsberg thought experiment (0.0027) yields an
equivalence of 7 points for each value of the Likert scale (and 130 for the constant). Again, a
low ambiguity preference score corresponds to ambiguity-averse preferences; a high ambiguity
score corresponds to ambiguity-seeking preferences. An ambiguity score of 292 corresponds to
ambiguity neutrality. Table 7 presents the ambiguity module together with this conversion rule.
Table 8 presents the descriptive statistics of the so-obtained ambiguity preference scores for both
samples of subjects. Panel A of table 8 shows that the average and standard deviation of the
ambiguity preference score are similar in both data samples: the average is around 262 points,
with a standard deviation of about 19.
Panel B examines the correlations of the ambiguity preference score with the ambiguity prefer-
ence benchmark and self-reported risk preferences using a single-item survey question following
Dohmen et al. (2011), controlling for age and gender. The self-reported risk preferences are avail-
able only in the follow up dataset. As expected, the in-sample correlation with the ambiguity
preference benchmark is substantial, and very close to the correlations between the fitted values
and the ambiguity preference benchmark, see table 6. Again, the out-of-sample correlation in
the second sample is smaller in magnitude but still strongly significant. Finally, table 8 shows
that, as expected, the ambiguity preference score is not capturing self-reported risk preferences
following Dohmen et al. (2011). This is in line with the theoretical prediction that risk and
ambiguity preferences are not correlated, and gives confidence that, empirically, the ambiguity
score is not picking up elements of risk preferences.
5 Conclusions
This paper proposes a novel and experimentally validated ambiguity preference module to mea-
sure individual ambiguity preferences. We use responses to a variety of thought experiments
and attitudinal survey questions to predict individual ambiguity preferences obtained from a
state-of-the-art incentivized experimental task. Applying an iterative selection procedure that
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Table 8: Ambiguity preference score
Panel A: Mean (standard deviation) ambiguity preference score
Data set Original sample Second sample
‘best’ module 262.74 (19.8) 269.51 (19.3)
Panel B: Correlations
Data set Original sample Second sample
Ambiguity preference benchmark 80.7094*** 52.7275***
(14.897) (16.865)
Age -0.0738 -0.2612
(0.200) (0.760)
Female -2.9476 5.6460
(3.233) (3.674)
Risk preferences (Dohmen et al., 2011) -1.3995
(0.880)
constant 233.6830*** 249.2658***
(10.659) (18.189)
R2 0.204 0.115
N 121 99
Panel A reports the average and standard deviation (in parentheses) of the ambiguity preference scores. Panel B
reports the correlation of the ambiguity preference score with the ambiguity preference benchmark and the risk
preferences measured following Dohmen et al. (2011). P-values are given in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
considers all possible combinations of predictors, the paper identifies one thought experiment
and four attitudinal questions that are best in predicting ambiguity preferences. This set forms
our ambiguity preference module.
The ambiguity preference module passes a number of validation tests, including in-sample and
out-of-sample tests using two completely different subject pools. Taken together, these tests show
that the ambiguity preference module allows the reliable measurement of ambiguity preferences
for different samples of subjects. The ambiguity preference module thus combines the rigour
of laboratory experiments with the convenience of survey questionnaires. It is simple, easy to
implement, and cost-effective. It can be used to reliably measure ambiguity preferences when
conducting incentivized laboratory experiments is infeasible. It therefore can be a valuable
tool for empirical researchers interested in measuring ambiguity preferences when conducting
large scale surveys or field studies, where it is often impractical to use incentivized decision
tasks. The preference module might also be useful to experimental researchers with time and
money constraints, who seek to include a simple control measure of ambiguity preferences in
experimental studies.
By experimentally validating an ambiguity preference module to measure ambiguity preferences,
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these results give some confidence in the ability to elicit ambiguity preferences more widely
and consistently. A validated and widely applicable measurement tool to quantify ambiguity
preferences is an important and useful contribution to the literature because it may increase the
comparability across future studies, thus improving our understanding of the effects of ambiguity
preferences on economic behavior.
Finally, the ambiguity preference module may have direct practical applications, for example,
in the financial service industry. While it is standard to use simple questionnaires to assess the
clients’ risk preferences, ambiguity preferences have been left unexplored because of the lack of
simple assessment methods. By using the ambiguity preference module, private banks could
improve the personality assessment of their clients to tailor better asset allocation strategies.
We do not want to claim that, in order to measure ambiguity preferences, the ambiguity pref-
erence module is always preferable over incentivized decision tasks. Yet, given the relevance of
ambiguity preferences for economic decision-making, we argue that ambiguity preferences should
be measured more often in empirical studies and we provide a toolkit to reliably do so.
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